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Abstract
We examine the e¢ ciency and distributional e¤ects of regressive and progressive public
R&D policies that target high-tech and low-tech sectors using a heterogenous-agent growth
model with in-house R&D and incomplete capital markets. We nd that such policies have
important implications for e¢ ciency and inequality. A regressive public R&D investment
nanced by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive e¤ect on individual
savings and e¤ort. However, it could also lower growth and welfare via its e¤ect on the
e¢ ciencyinequality trade o¤. Thus, the relationship between public R&D spending and
welfare is hump shaped admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending.
Using our baseline model and the US state level GDP data, we back out the degree of
regressiveness of public R&D investment in US states. We nd that US states are more
regressive in their R&D investment than the optimal regressiveness implied by our growth
model.
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1. Introduction
The role of public and private research and development (R&D) investment1 in
economic growth is a widely debated topic.2 However, the distributional e¤ect of
public R&D investment has received little attention. In the extant literature, the
focus is more on public education (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, 2003, Ben-
abou, 2002) and infrastructure and taxes (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Garcia and
Turnovsky, 2007, Getachew, 2010, Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2012, Getachew and
Turnovsky, 2015). R&D investment could have uneven impacts on the economy and
through this channel, it could impact rich and poor di¤erently. In general, most pub-
lic R&D investment in developed countries are concentrated on high-tech industries
such as information technology, biotechnology, communication, and environment in-
dustries. In the United States, for instance, public R&D investment in equipment
and software has increased from 20% in 1980 to 50% in 2001 which contributed to
rising inequality in the United States (US) in recent decades (Cozzi and Impullitti,
2010). R&D investment in South Korea is concentrated more on high-tech sectors
(Kim et al., 2013). In contrast, in most of the developing world, a signicant amount
of public R&D investment are made in agriculture, a low-tech sector dominated by
1R&D expenditure includes a broad range of activities: "Research and development (R&D)
comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge
(including knowledge of man, culture and society) and the use of this knowledge to devise new
applications." (http://www.oecd.org/sdd/08_Science_and_technology.pdf).
2Particularly, in early 90s, there was an inux of R&D based growth theories, following the
seminal works by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
that emphasize the role of R&D to economic growth, through inuencing technological progress.
R&D policies are also widely debated as to whether public R&D investment complements private
R&D investment or crowds it out (e.g., David et al., 2000). Early work in public R&D investment
includes Shell (1967).
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small scale farmers. Beintema et al. (2012) report an accelerated public investment
in agricultural R&D in developing countries during the period 2000 and 2008. Using
provincial data in China spanning more than four decades, Zhang and Fan (2004)
argue that government spending on agricultural R&D contributed to a reduction in
regional inequality.
Our own calculations suggest a contrasting relationship between inequality and
public R&D spending, consistent with previous studies. Figures 1 and 2 show rela-
tionships between the GINI index and R&D intensity in the US and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), respectively.3 In both regions, R&D spending has sharply increased
during the last two decades, but the inequality experience is opposite.4 While there
is a positive correlation between GINI and R&D investment across US states, for
SSA countries the correlation is negative. Given that R&D spending in the US is
more geared to high tech sector while in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) it is focused on
primarily on subsistence farming, this reversal of sign of the correlation between
R&D intensity and the GINI between Figures 1 and 2 is intriguing. Inequality could
3The R&D intensity is measured by the ratio of total R&D spending (including private and public
GDP) to state GDP. The breakdown of public and private R&D for each state is not available. The
National Science Foundations sources suggest that the federal share of total R&D spending is about
11.6% over the period 2008-15 All the GINI data came from US Census Bureau. The R&D intensity
data came from the Science, technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SSTI) database of the
US. The correlation coe¢ cient between R&D Intensity and State GINI index is 0.18. For SSA
countries the GINI and public R&D spending data came from World Bank (2015). Due to sparse
nature of the data, we take the average of GINI index from 2000 onward whatever data are available.
Same is done for the public R&D spending ratio. Details of all these data are available from the
authors upon request.
4The average annual agricultural R&D spending growth in SSA countries, for instance, increased
from 0.3% during 1981-1990 to 2.8% during 2000-2008 except for a small dip of .01% during 1990-
2000, which is indicative of the bulk of recent R&D innovations in SSA being progressive in nature
(Beintema et al., 2012).
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result from public R&D due to its destination.
Figure 1: Inequality and R&D Spending in US States
Figure 2: Inequality and PublicR &D Spending in SSA
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Motivated by this, we ask our key research question in this paper whether the
public R&D spending is likely to be regressive or progressive. We examine the
e¤ects of public R&D investment on e¢ ciency and inequality using the lens of a
heterogenous-agent growth model where agents are heterogenous in their initial en-
dowments of knowledge and their ability to generate knowledge. Our model includes
in-house R&D which yields monopolistic prot for the rms. Both inequality and
growth are endogenously determined. The source of endogenous growth is in-house
R&D investment using private and public resources. Endogenous inequality is gen-
erated due to missing credit and insurance markets, as in Loury (1981) and Benabou
(2000, 2002, 2005). The dynamics of aggregate variables and inequality are jointly
determined in the model that admits a closed-form analytical solution.
We do two related exercises using our growth model. First, we analyze the e¤ects
of redistributive innovation policies on steady state inequality, growth and welfare,
which is the main objective of this paper.5 Public R&D investment policies are
identied as regressive and progressive, based on their disproportional impact on
relatively large and small rms, respectively.6 Regressive R&D investment policy
aggravates inequality. On the other hand, regressive innovation policies have the
benet of promoting e¢ ciency due to positive incentives on agentssavings and work
e¤ort decisions. There is a potential trade-o¤ between growth and inequality in our
model due to incomplete capital markets. This makes the relationship between R&D
investment, growth as well as welfare nonlinear and hump shaped. Our calibrated
5Basu and Getachew (2015) study the role of redistributive policies in intergenerational mobility.
6We provide a more formal denition in the next section.
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baseline model suggests that the positive incentive e¤ects of a regressive innovation
far outweigh the negative e¤ects of a higher inequality on steady state welfare. This
makes the optimal redistributive innovation policy regressive in our model. A sen-
sitivity analysis suggests that the case for regressiveness of R&D policy is less in
economies with higher idiosyncratic risk in productivity and private innovation be-
cause it makes the negative inequality e¤ect of regressive R&D policy stronger. For
a su¢ ciently high idiosyncratic risk in knowledge innovation, the R&D policy could
be progressive in nature. This could explain the negative relation between inequality
and R&D intensity in SSA countries, reported in Figure 2, where uninsurable risk is
expected to be high. Due to lack of well developed nancial markets, R&D policy
could be quite progressive.
Second, motivated by the positive correlation between inequality and R&D in-
tensity in US states, we ask the question whether the public R&D in US states are
regressive in nature. Using our model and the state level GDP data for the US, we
back out the degree of regressivity in each US state. We nd that the estimated
R&D regressiveness in all US states is higher than the socially optimal regressivity
computed from our baseline model which suggests that the R&D in US states is too
regressive in nature.
Our work connects to a wider literature on inequality and growth. First, it
relates to the literature that analyzes growthinequality trade o¤ under imperfect
credit markets although this literature abstracts from productive public spending
feature of our model.7 For instance, the work of Benabou (2002) focuses primarily
7See for example Loury, (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Aghion, et
6
on the distributional and growth impact of progressive taxation while our focus is
on the redistributive e¤ects of productive public goods. Second, the paper is in
line with the literature on public education, infrastructure and inequality.8 With a
few exceptions (e.g., Ziesemer, 1990, 1995), this literature pays scant attention to
public R&D investment.9 Third, our work complements the literature on innovation
and inequality (Chu, 2010, Cozzi and Impullitti, 2010, and Aghion et al., 2015)
with the following important di¤erences. We focus on contrasting the e¤ects of
regressive and progressive innovation, assessing how regressive US innovation policy
is and designing an optimal regressive and progressive R&D policy while the focus
of the above studies is more on the e¤ects of innovation or innovation policy on
inequality.10 Finally, our study accords well with a branch of literature that attributes
the recent rise in inequality in many advanced economies to skill biased technical
change (Acemoglu, 2002 and Aghion, 2002). This literature, however, focuses on
private R&D investment or technical progress and abstracts from the optimal public
al. (1999) Benabou (2000, 2002, 2005), Bandyopadhyay and Tang (2011) and Basu and Getachew
(2015).
8Public education is at the center of the work by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 2003), Saint-
Paul and Verdier (1993), Sorensen (1993) and Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), among many others. In
contrast, recent work by Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007), Getachew (2010, 2012), Chatterjee
and Turnovsky (2012), and Getachew and Turnovsky (2015) focus on the e¤ects of infrastructure
on inequality. In contrast, we explicitly model the intermediate goods sector as characterized by
monopolistic competition, which is typical to R&D models as in Smulders and Klundert (2004).
9Ziesemer (1990, 1995) study the distributional conict that arises from government involvement
in knowledge creation. In his models, ability di¤erences among individuals lead to di¤erences in
their preferred tax rates. Particularly, individuals with higher (lower) ability prefer higher (lower)
technical progress which can be achieved through higher taxes than the social planners optimal tax
rate. Ziesemer, however, abstracts from the role of public policy on inequality and distributional
dynamics and the impact through which it has on growth and welfare.
10Chu (2010) argues that strengthening patent policy increases income inequality by raising the
return on assets. Whereas, Aghion et al. (2015) focus on the relationship between innovation, top
income inequality and social mobility for the U.S.
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R&D policy and the R&D e¤ects on US regional inequality that we are interested
in.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the model. Section 3
characterizes individual and aggregate (inequality) dynamics. Section 4 discusses the
e¤ects of di¤erent R&D policies on steady-state growth and inequality while Section
5 focuses on optimality of alternative R&D policies. Section 6 computes the degree
of regressivity in the US states using state level GDP data. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
We assume that the economy is populated with a continuum of heterogenous
agents, i 2 (0; 1). There is no population growth in the economy. The rst generation
of the ith agent is endowed with hi0 levels of knowledge.11 Initial distribution is given
and assumed to take log-normal, lnhi0  N (0; 20), which evolves endogenously in
equilibrium. Agents also di¤er in their respective productivity and creativity to
generate income and knowledge, respectively, where both are assumed to be i.i.d.
and log-normally distributed. Combined with labour, knowledge is used to produce
intermediate goods, which are, in turn, used for production of the nal goods.
There are three sectors in the economy, namely the nal goods, the intermediate
goods and the knowledge production sectors. Using a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function, a competitive rm transforms intermediate inputs
into a nal good. These di¤erentiated intermediate inputs are produced by monop-
11There is no capital in the economy, which is standard in the R&D growth literature, without
any loss of generality.
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olistically competitive rms. Each rm in this sector invests in an in-house R&D, in
the spirit of Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995), to expand a specialized know-
how that is required to produce a specialized input. The production of knowledge
requires both the use of public and private resources, and a backlog of knowledge
stock. The government levies a xed at rate tax on the income of individual agents
to nance the public good. This public good is provided disproportionately among
rich and poor agents to supplement private R&D investment.
2.1. Final goods
In the spirit of Benabou (1996), the nal goods and services are produced using









; " > 1 (1)
where xit is the intermediate input supplied by the ith intermediate goods rm
and a1 is a deterministic total factor productivity (TFP) parameter; it represents
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which are i.i.d. with mean one and a constant non-
zero variance, attached to each intermediate input, lnit  N ( {2=2;{2). " > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate inputs, which determines the
rmsmonopoly power, in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Prot maximization by the perfectly competitive rm, given a unit price of the












where pit denotes the price of the ith intermediate good and  " is the price elasticity
of demand. TFP and a positive shocks shift the demand curve upward.
2.2. Intermediate goods
The di¤erentiated intermediate goods rms are characterized with certain fea-
tures. First is the presence of specialization. Knowledge is rm-specic, and hence
the production of intermediate goods. Thus, each intermediate goods rm has some
monopoly power over its price. Consequently, the rate of returns and earnings are
di¤erent among rms in this sector. Second, a rm in this sector engages in an
in-house R&D investment to expand its specialized knowledge stock. The R&D in-
vestment is the only vehicle of technical progress. Third, individuals own rms, with
a one-to one correspondence between rms and individuals. This implies the capital
market is missing, similar to Benabou (2000, 2002, 2005).
As in Aghion et al. (2015), the ith rm in the intermediate goods sector needs
1=hit units of labour to produce one unit of its variety:
xit = hitlit (3)
where hit represents the stock of the rm specic knowledge, generated through in-
house R&D activity, which is specied below; and, lit is the raw labour input. Each
period, the rms prot consists of revenue from the sale of the intermediate good,
xit, net of the total labor cost (litwit) where wit is the wage rate per unit of labor.
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Thus, the rm has the following static optimization problem,
max
pit
it = pit (xit; :)xit   witlit
subject to the demand function (2). Plugging in lit from (3) and xit from (2) into
the above and maximizing it leads to the following pricing:12
pit = (wit=hit) "= ("  1) (4)
While wit=hit is the marginal cost of producing a unit of the intermediate input, the
elasticity of substitution, ", determines the mark-up over this cost.
The ith agent income, which is the sum of wages and prot income, is given by:
yit = pitxit (5)
Using (2), (3) and (4) into (5), one obtains:
yit = ait (lithit)
 y1 t (6)
where a  a1 and   ("  1)=".13
Equation (6) is the reduced form of individual production function that matches
individual income to output production, characterized by constant returns to scale
12Note that there is no explicit labour market in this economy as each household owns a rm and
is self employed. See Angeletos and Calvet (2006) for a similar setup.





 (1=") which upon plug-
ging this and (3) into (5) and rearranging terms yields (6).
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at individual (hit) and aggregate accumulative factors (ht) in total.14 However, there
is diminishing returns to individual factor. This shows that the model is basically
in the spirit of the Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) learning-by-doing endogenous
growth models.
Aggregating (6) leads to aggregate income (yt):15
yt = la
1=ht exp (dt) (7)
where dt is a composite parameter, which captures the relationship between aggregate
income and inequality:
dt  0:5 (  1)2t
where 2t denotes inequality at time t. Therefore, the aggregate production has a
simple Ak feature, in the spirit of Romer (1986), except that inequality drives the
dynamics in aggregate output.
2.3. In-house R&D
Similar to Ziesemer (1990, 1995), private knowledge production includes produc-
tive government investment. In the spirits of Smulders and van de Klundert (2004),
14As we see later, yt is a linear function of ht and lit = l, which is constant.
15Aggregating (6) from both sides gives
Eyit = ay
1 
t E (it (lithit)

), yt = ay1 t lE (hit)
We used the fact that it is i.i.d., Eit = 1 and lit = l as we see later in (16b). Then, from the
normal and lognormal relation, we have E (hit) = h

t e
0:5( 1)2t . Substituting the latter into the
above gives (7).
12
each intermediate goods rm invests in an in-house R&D to produce the knowhow








Government intervenes in the R&D process by investing in public R&D input (git)
that uses to complement the private sector, but with a redistributive intent. Accord-
ing to (8), knowledge is a product of both public and private investment (git and sit,
respectively), past knowledge stock of the rm (hit) and idiosyncratic ability shocks
(it+1). f; ; g 2 (0; 1) denote knowledge elasticities. it+1 is i.i.d. and follows a log-
normal distribution with mean one and a constant variance, ln it+1  N ( %2=2; %2).
The production function (8) exhibits constant-returns to scale ( +  +  = 1) that
makes the growth process endogenous as in any standard growth model.
2.4. Public investment in R&D
Public R&D investment is nanced levying a proportional income tax () on
the nal goods. The government balances the budget as in the growth and public




yitdi = yt (9)
where gt denotes the total public investment in R&D and  is the public expenditure
GDP ratio. Thus, a fraction of aggregate income is used to nance the public good.
We make a critical departure from the extant literature by abstracting from a
blanket public investment provision in R&D. Rather the government expenditure on
13
R&D has a redistributive component. Public R&D investment does not necessarily
benet individual rms proportionally. Small rms may benet disproportionately
from low-tech technologies while large rms do from high-tech technologies. For
instance, an innovation of a pedal-powered tractor is more benecial to small-scale
farmers vis-à-vis a high-powered tractors beneting large commercial farms. For-




where et is an adjustment factor used to make the aggregation "heterogeneity neu-
tral" as in Benabou (2000) and given by,
t  0:5!(1  !)2t (11)
Aggregating through (10) leads to a balanced government budget, given by (9).16
The key policy parameter is !, which brings a redistributive element in the pub-
lic spending on R&D (10). The magnitude and sign of ! determines the weight
and nature of this redistribution, whether public R&D investment is progressive or
regressive. We see this immediately when substituting (7) and (9) into (10):
ln git = lnt + ! lnhit + (1  !) lnht (12)
16Note that all our results hold in the case of et = 1, which could happen if ! = 0 or ! = 1.
This will be discussed later.
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where
t   la1= exp (dt + t)
Therefore, the government public expenditure is nothing but a loglinear resource
redistribution.
If ! = 0, then git = gt which makes the government spending on R&D a pure
public good. However, if ! = 1, the government expenditure is similar to a private
investment subsidy. When ! > 0, for a given amount of public good gt, the public
service received by the ith individual, git, is higher when hit=ht is larger. In other
words, agents with above average knowledge receives higher service from the public
good than the average. The reverse is true when ! < 0. Based on this consideration,
we refer to negative ! and positive ! as progressive and regressive public expenditure
respectively in line with the literature in progressive/regressive taxation.17










Note that in the special case, ! =  = 0; equation (13) reduces to Ziesemer (1990,
1995). The parameters  and  are ex ante knowledge elasticities whereas  + !
and    ! capture ex post intergenerational linkages associated with rm level
knowledge production. The latter account for individual and aggregate factors in
17In Benabou (2000, 2002), for instance, after-tax income is given by byit = (yit=eyt) eyt where yit
and eyt represent before-tax and threshold incomes, respectively;  , which has basically a similar
role as ! has in our model, represents the marginal tax rate whose sign determines the progres-
sivity/regressivity of the tax schedule. We di¤er from this literature, however, as we focus on the
expenditure side.
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the economy respectively, because from (7) and (9), gt is a linear function of ht. The
term ! captures the redistributive nature of the public variable and its implication
for individual knowledge accumulation. Redistribution thus impacts the economy via
the e¤ect on private and public knowledge elasticities. We see later individual optimal
decision is crucially dependent on + !, which is also the main determinant of the
evolution of inequality that in turn determines other macroeconomic dynamics.18
2.5. Household
There is a continuum of households indexed between (0; 1). Households own the
rms and also work in the R&D sector.19 Similar to Benabou (2002, 2005), the credit
and insurance markets are missing. We also assume members of the households are
endowed with units of labour that they supply elastically. Agents maximize their






t (ln cit   lit) (14)
where  > 1; E0 is an individuals expectation given information at date 0. The
budget constraint is given by:
cit + sit = (1  ) yit (15)
18For a given private investment ( sit) and public investment (gt), the rate of growth of knowledge
is not self sustained (decreases in hit) as in any standard endogenous growth model. The su¢ cient
condition to get a sustained growth is  +  +  = 1.
19Other models that use similar type of individual entrepreneurship include Benabou (2000, 2002,
2005) and Angeletos and Calvet (2005, 2006).
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where  represents a at rate income tax on both wage and prot income which is
dened earlier.
Applying standard methods, individual household decision rules can be derived
as follows:
sit = b (1  ) yit (16a)
lit = l = (= ( (1  b)))1= (16b)
cit = (1  ) (1  b) yit (16c)
where
b  = (1   ( + !)) (17)
Equations (16) are standard forms from the view point of household optimization.
Households supply constant amount of labour while saving rate is independent of rate
of returns as a consequence of log utility function. Also, both the saving rate and
e¤ort are independent of the at tax rate  , due to the logarithmic utility and Cobb-
Douglas production functions.20 At the same time, individuals internalize the e¤ects
of their knowledge acquisition on the public service that they receive, as both saving
rate and e¤orts depend on the public parameters ! and .
Individual saving rate and e¤ort increase with the discount factor (), elasticity
20Ziesemer (1995) and Getachew and Turnovsky (2015), by applying a more general utility and
production functions, show at rate taxes could have redistributive component.
17
of substitution ("), intergenerational spillover (), and the elasticity of private in-
vestment (). But, the e¤ect of ! and  on saving rate and labor supply depend on
the sign of !. Both increase if the R&D program is regressive (! > 0) while they
decrease if it is progressive (! < 0), the classic e¢ ciencyequity trade o¤.
We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Saving rate and labour supply increase (decrease) with regressive
(progressive) public R&D investment.
Proof. See equations (16a) and (16b).









hitdi where the left-hand side variables represent aggregate variables. Ag-
gregate savings and consumption are then given by, from aggregating (16a) and
(16c), respectively,
st = (1  ) byt (18)
ct = (1  ) (1  b) yt (19)
where aggregate income is given by (7). Finally, combining (18) and (19) with (9),
gives:
ct + st + gt = yt (20)
Equation (20) shows the economy-wide budget constraint at equilibrium where ag-




3.0.1. Optimal individual knowledge dynamics
The dynamics of optimal knowledge stock associated to the ith rm is derived
from (6), (7), (9), (13) (16a) and (16b):






t exp ((+ (1  ) ) dt + t) (21)
where a3  a(+)= (=)(+)=
  b (1  b) (+)= (22a)
   (1  ) (22b)
   + !+  (22c)
  + (1  )    ! (22d)
Equation (21) captures the optimal dynamics of knowledge at a rm level. 
and ! are policy controls while the rest are structural parameters. Such policies
impact individual knowledge production function via the TFP terms  and . The
dynamics of optimal individual knowledge also depends on the current individual
and aggregate knowledge variables, idiosyncratic risks both in the nal goods (it)
and R&D sectors (it+1) and current inequality. Risks in the nal goods sectors a¤ect
individual savings and investment indirectly via individual income whereas ability
shocks in the knowledge sector have a direct impact. The exponential term in (21)
captures the relationship between inequality and individual knowledge dynamics.
19
Negative dt reects the negative e¤ects of inequality on knowledge production at
rm level. Through its impacts on aggregate and subsequent individual savings and
investment, inequality negatively impacts individual knowledge accumulation.
3.1. Inequality dynamics
The dynamics of inequality is also derived from (21), by taking the log and
variance,
2t+1 = 
2{2 + %2 + 22t (23)
Given  2 (0; 1), (23) is a stable dynamics that converges to a steady state in-
equality. The variance of the idiosyncratic shocks ({2 and %2 ) will determine the
long-run property of the model. Volatility in the nal goods sector a¤ects inequality
via its e¤ect on individual savings while volatility in the R&D sector directly im-
pacts inequality dynamics. The root of the dynamics of inequality is determined by
, which, in turn, is a function of policy and structural parameters, ", , !,  and
. Higher intergenerational linkage (higher ) results in higher transitional inequal-
ity. Better private investment technology (higher ) implies slower convergence in
inequality. Private R&D investment elasticity () also impacts inequality through
individual response to luck, with a strong implication to long-run inequality.
The e¤ect of the public variables on the dynamics of inequality rather depends
on its redistributive feature (the sign of !). If ! < 0, higher elasticity of public R&D
investment (higher ) leads to faster convergence of inequality, and conversely. If
! = 0, i.e. public investment in R&D is proportionally provided and the elasticity 
20
has a neutral e¤ect in inequality. We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A regressive (progressive) R&D investment aggravates (mitigates)
transitory inequality. In other words, if ! > 0 (! < 0), given 2t , 
2
t+1 increases
(decreases) in !, and conversely.
Proof. From (23), if ! < 0, for given 2t then 
2
t+1 decreases in j!j, and conversely.
3.2. Income and consumption inequality
Income inequality (2yt) is a simple transformation of knowledge inequality based
on the reduced form production function (6). Since equilibrium labour supply, lit is
constant,
2yt = {2 + 22t (24)
Since private consumption (cit) is proportional to private income, the consumption
inequality (2ct) is equal to income inequality (
2
yt) in this setting. Therefore, unless
idiosyncratic risks are high, consumption and income inequalities are expected to be
smaller than 2t .
3.3. Aggregate wealth and growth dynamics
Aggregating individual knowledge dynamics (21) gives the dynamics of aggregate
knowledge:









q  0:5 (  1) (+ (1  ) ) < 0 (26a)
z  0:5 (   1)  ! (!   1) < 0 if ! < 0 (26b)
  0:5 (   1){2 < 0 (26c)
Credit market imperfections, combined with diminishing returns to individual in-
vestment, are crucial for the transitional dynamics of the economy, which are driven
entirely by the evolution of inequality. This contrasts sharply with Ak type endoge-
nous growth models where the economy jumps to its long-run equilibrium in the rst
instance. Lack of credit availability makes initial individual productivity di¤erences
persist. With diminishing returns to investment, the poor have a higher marginal
product than the rich which translates into di¤erences in growth rates among them.
However, inequality does not degenerate in equilibrium due to the presence of unin-
sured idiosyncratic shocks.
4. Steady state
Note that given  2 (0; 1), which is the su¢ cient condition for the stability of
the distributional dynamics, (23) converges to a unique inequality equilibrium. But,
with constant-returns to scale in knowledge production, inequality is the only source
of dynamics in the economy. As inequality converges to its equilibrium level, growth
also converges to its steady-state level. In this case from (23) and (25), long-run
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1 +  = a3  exp
 
2 ( +z+ q)

(27b)
where , z and q are dened in (26).
 is the steady-state growth rate of the economy. The long-run equilibrium of
the economy is a balanced growth path, with a constant non-zero level of inequality
(see Appendix A).
Several important results follow from (27). First, steady-state inequality increases
in volatility. Second, Proposition 2 also holds in the steady state. Third, in many
cases, the relationship between inequality and long-run growth is negative. If ! < 0,
then z < 0, inequality has unambiguously a negative impact on long-run growth.
This is easily seen as all the terms in the bracket in (27b) are negative. Also if ! > 0,
although we cannot rule out a positive relationship, for more plausible values of the
parameters, the relationship remains negative. Finally, redistributive policy (sign of
!) impacts long-run growth directly, via its e¤ect on agentssavings and e¤ort, and
indirectly, via the growthinequality trade o¤.
21Appendix A provides a detail on the derivation of the balanced growth path.
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5. Optimal redistributive policies
5.1. Growth maximizing policies
Should the government innovation policy be progressive or regressive to maximize
growth? For a homogeneous economy (especially, hi0 = h0 and, hence, 20 = 0), the
choice of ! is straightforward. In order to maximize growth, public R&D should be
regressive (! > 0) and should take the maximum attainable value because regressiv-
ity only promotes e¢ ciency via agentssavings and e¤ort decisions.
For the heterogenous case, however, this may not be necessarily true. The policy
e¤ect on growth could be rather nonlinear, as both inequality (2) and  could
increase in !. On the one hand, a regressive R&D policy encourages growth due to
its positive impact on savings and e¤ort; on the other, it has a negative impact on
growth via the inequalitygrowth trade o¤.
Proposition 3. (i) If 20 = 0, a regressive R&D policy unambiguously promotes
growth. (ii) If 20 6= 0 and {2 6= 0 (or %2 6= 0), the long-run growth e¤ect of ! is
ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We can have further insight on the nonlinearity, if we specify plausible parameter
values for real economies. We x the subjective discount factor  at 0:99, as in nu-
merous macroeconomic studies. Following Benabou (2002), we set the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution   1= (   1) to 0.20. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween intermediate goods is xed at 6 (Kollmann, 2002). The initial knowledge (h0)
and the initial distribution of knowledge (20) are normalized at unity. Getachew and
Turnovsky (2015) consider a 0:4 standard deviation for the logarithm of idiosyncratic
shocks. Based on this, we set {2 = %2 = 0:16.
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Using the World Bank (2015) database for the period 2005-2014, the average
public and private R&D spending GDP ratio is computed as 2:81% for the US. To
bring the R&D feature of the model closer to the data we calibrate the public R&D
spending ratio () at 0:548%. The parameter  represents the elasticity of knowledge
production with respect to private R&D spending. Following Jones and Williams
(2000), we set  equal to 0:5. The value for the elasticity of public knowledge
widely varies among empirical estimates.22 We use Levys (1990) estimate for the
public investment elasticity of private R&D for nine OECD countries between 1963
and 1984, which is about 0:34 and consistent with the estimate of Leyden and Link
(1991).23 This implies  = 0:16. Regarding the redistributive policy parameter, ! we
set a baseline value at unity, which implies that the inequality adjustment coe¢ cient
et = 1. It turns out that this baseline value of ! is close to the socially optimal
! reported later. Finally, we calibrate a1 to reproduce a 2% average annual growth
rates of GDP. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameter values.
22See David et al. (2000) for the survey of the literature.
23Leyden and Links estimate is based on a 1987 data set of 137 R&D laboratories for the U.S.
industries.
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Table 1: Baseline values
 0.99
 0.16 (Levy, 1990)
 0.5 (Jones and Williams, 2000)
 1    
 0.20 (Benabou, 2002)
{2 = %2 0.16 (Getachew and Turnovsky, 2015)
 0.00548 World Bank (2015)
a1 2.845 (Reproduces 2% annual growth rate)
" 6.00 (Kollmann, 2005)
! 1.00
Applying these values to (27b), we nd that the growth maximizing policy is
quite regressive (see Figure 3). Growth is in particular maximized when ! = 1:01.24
24Note that there is a restriction on ! for a stable inequality dynamics (23), 0 <  < 1. Given
our calibrated values, this means  1: 696 1 < ! < 1: 2451.
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Figure 3: Growth Maximizing Redistributive R&D Policy
5.2. Welfare maximizing redistributive innovation
While growth and inequality are important macroeconomic variables, the eco-
nomic signicance of any policy should be basically judged in terms of its impacts on
social welfare. Given that Vi0 = maxUi0 is the discounted sum of individual welfare,




Vi0di. Then, the steady-state aggregate welfare is given by (see
Appendix B for details):
W = (1  ) 1
 
ln c0   0:52c   l

+ = (1  )2 ln (1 + ) (28)
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where
c0 = (1  ) (1  b) y0 = (1  )(1  b)la1=h0 exp(0:5 (  1)20) (29)
2c = {2 + 22 (30)
where c0 and 2c are initial aggregate consumption and consumption inequality, re-
spectively.
The rst term in (28) captures the discounted initial aggregate welfare (at t = 0).
Given that h0 is predetermined, so is 20, which has a negative impact on welfare.
Since individuals derive a negative utility from increased e¤ort, the policy e¤ects (!)
on the initial welfare is nonlinear. While a higher ! may negatively a¤ect initial
welfare via an e¤ect on e¤orts and inequality, it may increase it through boosting
initial income (higher y0).
The second term in (28) comes from the economy-wide growth rate, which cap-
tures individualsrewards for saving and investing in their future. In this case, any
e¤ect policy has on growth would directly pass to welfare. A higher ! unambiguously
raises the steady state inequality, 2 as seen from (27a) and through this channel it
lowers growth and hence welfare. On the other hand, it promotes investment and
raises e¤ort that could in turn raise growth and thus welfare.
For reasonable parameter values, welfare maximizing R&D policy is also regres-
sive due to a strong growth e¤ects on aggregate welfare (see Figure 4). A regressive
innovation policy with positive ! clearly dominates a neutral second best innova-
tion policy with zero value of !. Aggregate welfare is in particular maximized when
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! = 0:996, which is slightly less regressive than the case for growth due to an ad-
ditional adverse e¤ect of a regressive R&D policy on initial consumption. For our
calibrated model, the optimal ! is thus close to unity.
Figure 4: Welfare Maximizing Redistributive R&D Policy
5.3. Optimal at rate tax
Although our main focus here is on !, note that both ! and  are policy variables.
With respect to  , the optimal tax (the tax that maximizes welfare) is derived from
(28),
@W=@ = 0)   = = (1 +  ( +   1)) (31)
which is independent of !. It bears emphasizing that there is no distributional
conict that arises in the choice of the tax rate  , which is similar to Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992) but in contrast to Ziesemer (1990,1995).
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The growth maximizing tax rate ( g ) could also be easily computed from (27b):
@=@   g = = (+ ) (32)
which is also independent of redistribution, !.  g reaches its upper bound when
 = 0 when there is, no, or, little private investment in R&D. Comparing the two,
    g ,   1
the welfare maximizing tax rate is higher than the growth maximizing tax rate be-
cause the individual is impatient ( < 1) and prefers to avoid lower consumption.
5.4. Public versus private R&D investment
A private subsidy environment (! = 1) uniformly dominates the pure public
good environment (! = 0) both in terms of growth and welfare (see Figure 5 and 6,
respectively). The optimal tax rate () is independent of ! and the output elasticity
of ht, consistent with the discussion in the preceding section. This is a redeeming
feature of our simple model because it implies that maintaining equity does not
entail additional tax cost. Growth and welfare maximizing tax rates are 0.405 and
0.4, respectively.
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Figure 5: Growth rates: ! = 0 versus !=1
Figure 6: Welfare: ! = 0 versus !=1
5.5. Sensitivity Analysis
For our baseline calibrated model the optimal redistributive innovation is regres-
sive. The adverse e¤ect of regressive innovation on inequality is dominated by the
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positive incentive e¤ect on saving and labour supply. A higher idiosyncratic risk
either in the form a higher % or higher { elevates the consumption inequality 2c in
the steady state welfare function (28) and thus it lowers the optimal regressiveness
of R&D policy. Table 2 presents the sensitivity of the optimal ! with respect to a
higher variances of idiosyncratic shocks to output and knowledge production, namely
{ and % respectively. Higher variances of these two shocks unambiguously lower the
optimal !. The decline in ! is sharper for a rise in {. For a su¢ ciently high value of
the ability shock ({) variance of the knowledge production, the optimal ! is negative
which means that the R&D policy turns progressive in nature.
Our sensitivity analysis suggests that a higher uninsurable risk either in the goods
producing or knowledge producing sector lowers the optimal regressiveness of the
R&D policy. This result has implications for the negative relation between inequality
and R&D intensity for the SSA countries reported in Figure 2. Since the uninsurable
risk in output and knowledge production technology is too high in SSA countries due
to lack of well developed insurance markets, a benevolent government responds to
this high uninsurable risk by making the R&D less regressive and possibly progressive
to ensure that the inequality does not escalate.
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Table 2: E¤ects of idiosyncratic risks and ability on redistributive innovation policy (!)
{  !
% #
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4
0.4 0.996 0.841 0.611 0.364 0.14 -0.052
0.8 0.777 0.651 0.474 0.281 0.093 -0.078
1.2 0.658 0.544 0.390 0.221 0.054 -0.102
1.6 0.599 0.490 0.344 0.185 0.028 -0.120
2.0 0.568 0.460 0.318 0.164 0.012 -0.133
2.4 0.549 0.442 0.302 0.151 0.000 -0.141
6. How regressive is R&D in US states?
In Figure 1 we presented a stylized fact using state level US data that regional
inequality is higher in the US where the intensity of R&D spending is higher. In this
section, we provide an estimate of regressivity of R&D (measured by !) in each state
based on our model results. We exploit two key equations of our model (namely
(22c) and (27a) to back out ! from the regional GINI coe¢ cient data for the US.
One computes ! from the model using the US state level GDP data as follows.
Exploiting the lognormality property of our model, compute the mean to median
ratio using the variance of ln yit. The steady state mean to median ratio of income






















Finally, using (22c), compute !:
! =
      

(35)
The annual median household income is available for each state, from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. However, there is no corresponding mean household income
available. We, therefore, constructed a series for it by using per capita state income,
population and the number of households in each state.25 Multiplying the per capita
income by population upon dividing it by the number of households, we generate a
series for income per household data for each state over the sample period 2005-2015.
We compute the time average of mean and median household income for computing
the variance of log income using (33). Following the steps above, we compute ! for
each US state. While computing ! , we x the rest of the parameters at the baseline
levels as shown in Table 1. Our nding is that estimated ! for each state is uniformly
25All data are available in the US Bureau of Economic Analysis website (https://www.bea.gov/)
for the period 2005-2015.
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higher than unity for all states. New York has the highest, at ! = 1:13, while Utah
has the lowest, at ! = 1:04. Therefore, the regressivity of innovation policies in
US states is higher than the socially optimal regressive innovation from our baseline
model, which is around unity.
7. Conclusion
R&D policy has uneven impacts on the economy, a fact which has not received
much attention in the literature. While regressive R&D policy could escalate eco-
nomic inequality, it could promote growth through creating incentives. On the other
hand, progressive R&D policy could benet poor at the expense of long run growth.
Our stylized facts suggest that in the US, R&D policy has signicant regressive con-
sequences while in SSA and other countries it is progressive in nature. In this paper,
we have developed a heterogenous-agent growth model with in-house R&D to un-
derstand these broad empirical regularities. In our model, growth and inequality are
endogenously determined. We show that a regressive R&D policy unambiguously
escalates economic inequality while it promotes growth by incentivising private in-
novation and labour supply. Such impacts may partly be compromised due to the
inverse inequality-growth relationship; however, for plausible parameter values, we
have found that the optimal R&D policy is regressive in nature because the positive
growth e¤ect outweighs the negative inequality e¤ect. Using US state level data, we
have backed out the regressivity policy parameter from our model and have found
that the R&D policy in the US is indeed regressive in nature and it is more regressive
than the optimal level suggested by our baseline model. For SSA countries, our model
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implies that the observed negative relation between R&D intensity and inequality
could reect governments progressive redistributive stand due to high uninsurable
risk in these economies, which otherwise could make the burden of inequality socially
unbearable.
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Appendix
A. Aggregate wealth and growth dynamics
From (7), (9) and (19), all aggregate variables except aggregate knowledge grow
at the same rate:










Note that (A.1) holds along the transitional dynamics where inequality evolves based





t = 1, the economy will be in a balanced growth path (BGP) where t = .
B. Derivation of the steady state welfare
Note rst that the discounted sum of individual welfare is simply Vi0 = maxUi0.

















ln ct   0:52t;c   l









c0 (1 + )
t  0:52c   l
= = (1  )2 ln (1 + ) +
 
ln c0   0:52c   l

= (1  )
where c0 is given by, from (18) and (7),
c0 = (1  )(1  b)la1=h0 exp(d0)
C. Proof for Proposition 4
(i) If 20 = 0, which implies hi0 = h0, then, from (21), 
2
1 = 
2 = 2{2 + %2. It is
then straightforward to see  increases in !.
(ii) If 20 6= 0 and {2 6= 0 (or %2 6= 0), then from (21), 2 = 2{2= (1  2) (or
2 = %2= (1  2)). In this case, both 2 and  increase in ! in (27b), leading to an
ambiguous e¤ect of ! on growth.
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